

## INCLUSIVE READINGS OF THE SPANISH PRONOUN *UNO* (‘ONE’): GRAMMATICAL AND PRAGMATIC PROPERTIES

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### *Abstract*

The third person indefinite pronoun *uno* ‘someone’ has readings in which it includes the speaker, and is similar to the pronoun *yo* (‘I’) (a first person definite pronoun). What factors allow a third person indefinite pronoun to refer to the speaker has not been thoroughly investigated from a grammatical point of view. Our first objective is to study the contexts in which reference to the first person is possible (so-called *arbitrary* and *concealing* uses of *one*). Our second objective is to articulate a proposal that explains the inclusion of the speaker in both cases. We hypothesize that in the arbitrary use the speaker’s inclusion derives from a pragmatic inference, while in the concealing reading *uno* behaves as a definite pronoun. We will investigate why the speaker chooses *uno* (‘one’) instead of *yo* (‘I’) to refer to himself/herself, and how grammar and pragmatics interact to convey subjectivity. Our third goal is to explain the inclusive uses of *uno* from the notions of *evidentiality* and *intersubjectivity*. The pronoun *uno* gives clues about the source of information expressed by the proposition (personal experience or general knowledge) and about the access to the information (unshared/shared information).

*Keywords:* pronoun *uno*; person; evidentiality; genericity; intersubjectivity; speaker concealment.

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## LECTURAS INCLUSIVAS DEL PRONOMBRE *UNO* EN ESPAÑOL: PROPIEDADES GRAMATICALES Y PRAGMÁTICAS

### *Resumen*

El pronombre indefinido de tercera persona *uno* ‘alguien’ tiene lecturas en las que se incluye al hablante y es similar al pronombre *yo* (un pronombre definido de primera persona). No se ha investigado a fondo desde el punto de vista gramatical qué factores permiten que un pronombre indefinido de tercera persona haga referencia al hablante. Nuestro primer objetivo es estudiar los contextos en los que es posible la referencia a la primera persona (usos denominados *arbitrario* y *encubridor* de *uno*). Nuestro segundo objetivo es articular una propuesta que explique la inclusión del hablante en ambos casos. Nuestra hipótesis es que en el uso arbitrario la inclusión del hablante deriva de una inferencia pragmática, mientras que en la lectura encubridora *uno* se comporta como un pronombre definido. Investigaremos por qué el hablante escoge *uno* en lugar de *yo* para referirse a sí mismo, y cómo la gramática y la pragmática interactúan para transmitir subjetividad. Nuestro tercer objetivo es explicar los usos inclusivos de *uno* a partir de las nociones de *evidencialidad* e *intersubjetividad*. El pronombre *uno* da pistas sobre la fuente de información expresada por la proposición (experiencia personal o conocimiento general) y sobre el acceso a la información (información no compartida/compartida).

*Palabras clave:* pronombre *uno*; persona; evidencialidad; genericidad; intersubjetividad; encubrimiento del hablante.

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we are going to deal with certain non-canonical uses of the grammatical person, specifically, the use of the indefinite 3rd person pronoun *uno* (‘one’) to refer to the speaker, that is, the 1st person. We want to answer a double question. First, we want to find out how it is possible, from the grammatical point of view, that a 3rd person indefinite pronoun can refer to the speaker, when normally a 1st person personal pronoun (definite, therefore) is used for this purpose; and secondly we want to understand the grammatical mechanisms that allow it.

Secondly, from a pragmatic point of view, we are interested in understanding what is the context that allows the reading of 1st person of *uno*, and what makes a speaker choose this indefinite pronoun to talk about himself/herself. As Siewierska (2004, p. 236) points out, in the languages of the world the use of impersonal

constructions (such as the reflexive passive or sentences with impersonal *se* in Spanish) is a general strategy to avoid person marking. The same is true for the use of forms without person marking (in the sense that it is 3rd person, as opposed to 1st or 2nd) such as *one* in English, *on* in French or *man* in German. This depersonalization strategy would also include the Spanish pronoun *uno*. These constructions are typically used to refer to all humans, so that the speaker and addressee can be included (uses called *inclusive*), although these forms are also used to refer to specific individuals. The indefinite forms *uno/una* ('one<sub>masc./fem.</sub>') would be a way to avoid direct reference to the self.

Our starting point is to explain how the grammatical system allows the use of *uno* to refer to the 1st person, and then we will see what is implied when a speaker in a context of usage has this added option for the reference to the 1st person and chooses the form *uno* to refer to him/herself. In short, we are interested in studying the way in which grammar and pragmatics share the work of constructing the reference of the pronoun *uno*. For this purpose, it is essential to differentiate three readings of the indefinite pronoun *uno*: existential 'someone' (1a), arbitrary 'anyone, including myself' (1b) and concealing 'I' (1c). The last two examples illustrate the uses in which the speaker is traditionally considered to be included in the reference of *uno*.<sup>3</sup>

- (1) a. {Uno/una} me ha dicho que mañana va a llover.  
 '{One<sub>masc./fem.</sub>} told me that it is going to rain tomorrow'  
 b. {Uno/una} debe prestar atención a los mayores.  
 '{One<sub>masc./fem.</sub>} should pay attention to the elders'  
 c. Cuando {uno/una} era joven, había pesetas en lugar de euros.  
 When {one<sub>masc./fem.</sub>} was young, there were pesetas instead of euros'

In this article we will not deal with the unmarked existential reading (1a), in which *uno* is equivalent to 'a person, someone', but we will focus on the two *masking* readings of the self (1b) and (1c). In section 2 we will syntactically differentiate the two readings and propose an analysis that explains the fact

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3. In this article we deal only with non-anaphoric readings, which we will call *pronominal*. The indefinite *uno* can also appear in contexts in which the interpretation of the tacit noun is recovered from the previous linguistic context: *Se compró un vestido rojo y uno  $\emptyset$  verde* ('She bought a red dress and a green one'). In this case, there is no proper pronoun, since the content of the noun changes according to the context and there is no incorporation of the noun to the article, as we will propose later for pronominal uses.

that they can refer, through different strategies, to the self. In section 3 we will point out the discursive values of the inclusive readings of the pronoun *uno*. Finally, in section 4 we will explain the inclusive uses of *uno* from the notions of *evidentiality* and *intersubjectivity*, i.e. from the notions of *source* and *access* to the information. On the one hand, the pronoun *uno* gives clues about the source of the information, which oscillates between personal experience and general knowledge. On the other hand, the meaning of the inclusive pronoun *uno* varies between shared and unshared information.

## 2. INCLUSIVE READINGS OF THE PRONOUN *UNO* ('ONE')

In this section we will deal with the analysis of the 3rd person indefinite pronoun *uno* when it is used to refer to the speaker. To do so, first of all, we will see that it is necessary to distinguish two uses of the pronoun, which appear in distinct syntactic contexts and we will briefly review the contexts that allow us to differentiate them. Secondly, we will show that the strategy for referring to the self is different in the two uses of the form *uno*, since one implies genericity and the other does not.

### 2.1. *Contexts of readings that hide the speaker*

In this section we will see the contexts of occurrence of the arbitrary *uno* and the concealing *uno*. The fundamental idea is that the arbitrary reading of *uno* only occurs in generic contexts (1b), while the concealing reading can appear in both generic and episodic contexts (1c).

As initially described by Ridruejo Alonso (1981) and Hernanz Carbó (1990), the arbitrary reading of the subject is obtained in generic sentences, devoid of any definite temporal reference. In these sentences, the indefinite pronoun *uno* has human reference and its meaning is basically 'any person'. The pragmatic leap that is made is the passage from referring to any person to referring to the human most directly present in the act of enunciation, that is, the speaker (De Cock, 2014, p. 111).<sup>4</sup> Thus, from 'any person' *uno* extends to 'any person like me', and hence the implication that

4. This leap that allows *uno* to refer to the speaker is not an exclusive property of the indefinite pronoun, but can occur with other indefinite noun phrases, provided there is a generic context, as the examples in (i) show. In Vázquez Rojas (2014, p. 243) the same idea is expressed for English examples of the type of *A girl can dream*, in which the speaker is included in the class denoted by the indefinite noun phrase:

(i) {Una persona/una mujer} tiene derecho a soñar  
'{A person/a woman} has the right to dream'

*uno* refers to the speaker.<sup>5</sup> However, in the reading we have termed *concealing*, the pronoun *uno* refers only to the speaker, no generalization is involved from which the self is derived, and *uno* is equivalent to the first person singular pronoun *yo* ('I').<sup>6</sup>

Generic sentences are constructed with imperfective tenses, individual-level predicates, temporal and locative adjuncts, conditional and temporal subordinates, and deontic predicates.<sup>7</sup> These elements, separately or together, provoke a reading that is not spatio-temporally located, which favors the arbitrary reading of subject *uno*. The concealing reading, on the other hand, can also be obtained in episodic contexts, as observed in the examples in (2b)-(4b), as opposed to those in (2a)-(4a), with generic reading; see Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024) for a more detailed analysis of these contexts.

- (2) a. Uno disfruta mucho en vacaciones.  
'{One enjoys/I enjoy} a lot on vacation'  
b. Uno disfrutó mucho en vacaciones.  
'I enjoyed a lot on vacation'
- (3) a. En ese restaurante, uno come muy bien.  
'In that restaurant, {one eats/I eat} very well'  
b. Uno come muy bien.  
'I eat very well'
- (4) a. Uno aprende cuando se equivoca.  
'{One learns/I learn} when one makes mistakes'  
b. Uno aprende.  
'I learn'

In all of the above sentences, the disappearance of the genericity activator causes the sentences in (2b)-(4b) to have only the concealing reading. Note, however, that

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5. As we will see in § 2.2, the pronoun *uno* in these contexts normally refers to the speaker, but it need not do so; a reading in which reference is made to people in general 'any person' is also possible, without the speaker necessarily being included. We propose that the *I* reading is a pragmatic inference, but it is not part of *uno*'s systematic meaning. The grammatical system allows it, and a pragmatic inference explains it.

6. In other Romance languages, such as Italian, there is no such use of the indefinite *uno* in non-generic contexts. In English, according to Mackenzie & Martínez Caro (2012, p. 180), «the use of *one* as an alternative to *I* [...] is - at least in the popular mind - associated with the speech of the British Royal Family».

7. On generic readings with arbitrary singulars in Spanish, see Ridruejo Alonso (1981); Hernanz Carbó (1990); Leonetti Jungl (1999); Fernández Soriano & Táboas Baylín (1999); RAE-ASALE (2009); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024).

in all the examples in (2a)-(4a), in addition to the arbitrary reading, the concealing reading is possible, in which the speaker refers exclusively to himself/herself and makes a generalization in which the self is constant, just as if a personal pronoun appeared in this context (*Yo disfruto mucho en vacaciones* ‘I enjoy a lot on vacation’, as opposed to *Yo disfruté mucho en vacaciones* ‘I really enjoyed my vacation’).<sup>8</sup> The choice depends on the intention of the speaker, who may want to make a generalization that also includes him/her, or may simply refer to him/herself, but avoids doing so directly with the use of the pronoun *yo* (‘I’).

Sentences have the generic reading if the property denoted by the predicate can be conceived as a characteristic of the relevant class. Thus, in (3b) *comer bien* (‘eating well’) is not considered a typical property of persons and so only an episodic reading obtains, in which *uno* refers only to the speaker, despite the presence of an imperfective tense. Thus, one could conceive of a conversation in which someone talking about himself would say: *Es que uno come muy bien* (‘I just eat very well’). The locative adjunct *en ese restaurante* (‘in that restaurant’) allows us to obtain the generic reading in such a case. The same result would be obtained by adding to this predicate (*comer bien* ‘eating well’) a conditional sentence (5a) or a deontic predicate (5b):

- (5) a. Uno come bien si no toma mucho dulce.  
 ‘You eat well if you don’t eat a lot of sweets’  
 b. Uno debe comer bien.  
 ‘One should eat well’

In summary, we have shown that in a generic sentence the indefinite pronoun *uno* can have the arbitrary reading (‘anyone like me’) and also the concealing reading (‘I’), whereas in episodic contexts only the concealing reading occurs.

## 2.2. Analysis of the arbitrary and concealing *uno*

In our analysis, we start from the meaning and grammatical behavior of the indefinite pronoun *uno*. From its basic meaning ‘a person’,<sup>9</sup> we develop the values

8. This explains why it is sometimes difficult to separate both readings, as Fernández Ramírez (1986, IV, § 8.4, 8.7) rightly pointed out. However, it is important to remember that in episodic contexts only concealing use is possible.

9. In Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024) we propose an analysis in which a null noun with the meaning ‘person’ incorporates to the indefinite article: *uno* ‘a person, somebody’ = *un* +  $\emptyset$  ‘person’. In

of the form *uno* linked to the 1st person. Our proposal is that the basic meaning of the indefinite pronoun, in a generic context, is 'any person' (6), hence it may not include the speaker (6a) (Gelabert-Desnoyer, 2008; De Cock, 2014); but it usually means the speaker 'any person like me' (6b), or else the speaker and the hearer 'any person like you and me', the latter in certain contexts, as in (6c), which could be a sentence said by a mother to her child:<sup>10</sup>

- (6) a. Uno corre el riesgo de ir a la cárcel si decide evadir impuestos.  
'One runs the risk of going to jail if one decides to evade taxes'  
b. Uno no puede vivir con este calor.  
'One cannot live in this heat'  
c. ¡Uno tiene que pedir permiso para levantarse de la mesa!  
'You have to ask permission to get up from the table!'

We will deal with the way in which the indefinite *uno* acquires this meaning in section 2.2.1. On the other hand, from its use in generic contexts, the form *uno* has become specialized to speak only of the speaker without explicitly naming him or her. In this second case, as we will see in section 2.2.2, the form *uno* ceases to behave as an indefinite pronoun and has the grammatical characteristics of a personal pronoun.

### 2.2.1. Generalization as a means of hiding the speaker

The arbitrary *uno* appears only in generic contexts, in which it takes the reading 'any person'. The formal procedure by which it acquires such a meaning is the same as that by which an indefinite nominal phrase acquires a generic reading in such a context. Recall that the indefinite pronoun *uno* is nothing more than the sum of the indefinite article and an empty nominal category with a human meaning. An indefinite nominal phrase, unlike a definite one, does not have a generic reading by itself,<sup>11</sup> but acquires such a reading, which could be considered a non-specific

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the formal analysis that we propose the null noun raises to a functional head called Predicative Phrase (PredP) where indefinite determiners originate.

10. In such a case, the mother would use the masculine *uno* (one<sub>masc</sub>), instead of the feminine *una* (one<sub>fem</sub>), because she would not be talking about herself through the generalization, but through a generalization that includes the addressee, in this case her son, and also the speaker.

11. On the generic reading of indefinite nominal phrases, see among others, Corblin (1987, § 1.4); Krifka, Pelletier, Carlson, ter Meulen, Chierchia & Link (1995); Dobrovie-Sorin & Beyssade (2012, § 7); or Corblin (2012). For Spanish, see Leonetti Jungl (1999, § 12.3.3); or Gutiérrez-Rodríguez (2018).

interpretation rather than a generic one, by being bound by a generic operator. Thus, instead of having the unmarked or existential reading by being bound by existential closure (7b), the arbitrary reading (7a) is obtained, as reflected in the approximate glosses of the following examples:

- (7) a. Un perro pastor tiene un olfato especial.  
 ‘Any sheepdog has a special sense of smell’  
 b. Luisa tenía un perro pastor.  
 ‘Luisa had a sheepdog’

In the example of (7a) a sheepdog does not refer to a specific dog, but a generalization is made that extends to any sheepdog. This is so because the sentence is a generic statement. This interpretation disappears if the present tense (which favors the generic reading) is replaced by a past tense, as shown in (7b), where a specific dog is being referred to and no generalization is made.

The fundamental question is how to explain that a 3rd person singular indefinite nominal phrase can refer to the speaker. Our idea, which we have developed in more detail in Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024), is that the inclusion of the speaker is a pragmatic inference that is carried out on the basis of the meaning of *uno* (‘a person’) and the generic context in which it appears.

The presence of *uno* in generic contexts expresses a generalization about a set of persons and, therefore, this generalization can be applied to each of them, including the speaker.<sup>12</sup> According to our proposal, a nominal phrase can include the speaker in the arbitrary reading, despite being 3rd person, for two reasons: first, because the variable restrictor is interpreted as ‘person’, as we have seen above; and, second, because the generic context allows a generalization to be made about all persons; this generalization naturally includes the speaker.

According to Moltmann (2006, pp. 266-273), which we follow here, this generalization can be elaborated in two ways: either an inference from the 1st person, so that one starts from a particular experience and generalizes (*Uno no puede sobrevivir en esta casa con tanto calor* ‘One cannot survive in this house with so much heat’); or, an inference to the 1st person, in which one starts from a generalization that is established independently of the speaker’s experience (a

12. Recall that the generic *uno* can simply mean ‘any person’ and not specifically refer to the speaker. It is true that it has specialized to refer to the speaker, but this is probably due to the fact that there are many lexical items with a similar content, such as *alguien* (‘someone’), *alguno* (‘someone’) or even the nominal phrase *una persona* (‘a person’).



law or a general recommendation) and, from it, arrives at the speaker (*Uno debe ser puntual* 'One must be punctual').

In either case, there is a generalization in which the speaker can be included, so that the generalization involving *uno* is a way of hiding the speaker and referring to him or her at the same time.<sup>13</sup> In summary, we have proposed in this section that the indefinite *uno* ('a person') acquires in a generic context a universal value in which the speaker can be included through a pragmatic inference, so that the speaker becomes the representative of a class. The use of *uno* ('one') instead of *yo* ('I') implies, on the part of the speaker, both the hiding of the self and a generalization.

### 2.2.2. Another way of hiding the speaker: the concealing *uno* ('one')

As we have already seen, the form *uno* has a reading, which we call *concealing*, in which it refers only to the speaker and in which, as opposed to the arbitrary *uno*, no generalization is involved. The sentence in (8a) has two interpretations, a more general one, in which the speaker includes himself in a generalization (arbitrary reading) and another one in which he speaks only of himself (concealing). A generalization about living in France is still made, but the subject is a constant, just as if the pronoun *yo* ('I') appeared. In (8b) only the concealing interpretation is possible, since the absence of a generic context prevents making the relevant generalization.

- (8) a. *Uno vive bien en Francia.* (arbitrary/concealing)  
'{One/I} lives well in France'  
b. *Uno vivió bien en Francia.* (#arbitrary/concealing)  
'I lived well in France'

In the concealing use, the presence of the feminine form *una* ('one<sub>fem.</sub>') is more natural if the speaker is a woman (RAE-ASALE, 2009, § 8n-ñ). It is much less frequent for a female speaker to use *uno* in the masculine to refer to herself, so that the following statement would seem strange in the mouth of a woman: #*Uno ya te avisó, ahora no te quejes* ('One<sub>masc.</sub> already warned you, now don't complain').<sup>14</sup>

13. In the case of other arbitrary singulars, such as the use of the personal pronoun *tú* ('you'), the mechanism is the inverse, in the sense that we start from a deictic person and from there we generalize. As already pointed out by Fernández Ramírez (1986, 55-56), the result is approximately the same.

14. It is possible, however, to use the masculine form for the arbitrary use, since in this case the unmarked masculine is being used to make a generalization in which the speaker is included, as shown in the example in (i), taken from RAE-ASALE (2009: § 15.8ñ):

The concealing interpretation is referential. In this case, the pronoun *uno* functions grammatically as a personal pronoun, as we will explain below (for a more detailed description of this behavior, see Fernández Ramírez (1986); Gómez Torrego (1992); RAE-ASALE (2009, § 15.8m-p); and Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024, § 5-6). In this case, the predication is made only about the speaker, not of a set of persons in which the speaker is included. The following grammatical properties of the concealing *uno* allow us to characterize it as a definite nominal phrase similar to a personal pronoun.

First, the concealing *uno* has the behavior of a definite nominal phrase. It cannot be a direct object of the verb *haber* ('there is'), which requires indefinite nominal phrases. In (9b), the only possible reading of *uno* is existential ('someone, a guy'), and a concealing reading like the one in (9a) is not possible:

- (9) a. Uno estaba en la cocina cuando empezó la gran tormenta.  
'I was in the kitchen when the big storm started'  
b. #Había uno en la cocina cuando empezó la gran tormenta.  
'There was one in the kitchen when the big storm started'

Secondly, the concealing *uno* establishes scope relations like a personal pronoun and not like a quantifier. In the sentence in (10a), there is a reading in which *uno* is equivalent to the speaker, in which it is equivalent to (10b); furthermore, the existential reading is possible, with wide scope ('There is a person on whom they all depended') and with narrow scope ('Each person depended on someone different') of *uno* with respect to the quantifier *todos* ('everyone'). These two possibilities, typical of an indefinite nominal phrase, do not occur in the concealing reading.

- (10) a. En aquella excursión todos dependían de uno.  
'In that excursion, everyone depended on one'  
b. En aquella excursión todos dependían de mí.  
'On that trip everyone depended on me'

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- (i) SARA: «No hubo cambios importantes en los gastos de la familia después de que me dieron el préstamo. Lo que cambió fue que pude comprar algunas cosas para la casa como adornos, o una mesita para la televisión, pero pocas cosas. Cosillas que a veces uno no puede y que compra así»  
SARA: «There were no major changes in the family's expenses after I got the loan. What changed was that I was able to buy some things for the house, such as ornaments, or a small table for the TV, but only a few things. Little things that sometimes you can't afford and that you buy that way»

Third, the pronoun *uno* does not accept restrictive modifiers, be they relative clauses or restrictive adjectives, and can instead be modified by the adjective *mismo* ('itself') in a manner similar to that of a personal pronoun:

- (11) a. Una misma se ofrece a ir a recogerte al aeropuerto.  
 'Me myself can pick you up at the airport'  
 b. Yo misma me ofrezco a ir a recogerte al aeropuerto.  
 'I myself can pick you up at the airport'

Concealing *uno* is only compatible with appositive or non-restrictive relatives, as pointed out in Gómez Torrego (1992, p. 17). While in (12a), with an appositive relative, a concealing reading is possible, in which one speaks of oneself, in (12b) this reading is not possible, due to the presence of the restrictive relative. The explanation for this behavior is the same as that offered for personal pronouns or proper names. Since the concealing *uno* refers directly to the speaker, it does not accept restrictive modifiers, which contribute to the delimitation of the set from which the referent of the phrase is taken.

- (12) a. Uno, que detesta la playa, no va a la costa en verano.  
 'One, who hates the beach, does not go to the coast in summer'  
 b. Uno que detesta la playa no va a la costa en verano.  
 'One who hates the beach does not go to the seaside in summer'

Fourth, the concealing *uno* requires clitic doubling if it is a direct object (Fernández Ramírez, 1986, p. 52; Gómez Torrego, 1992, p. 17; RAE-ASALE, 2009, § 15.8m, 16.14l-m, 16.14m). In Spanish personal pronouns require clitic doubling, as seen in the examples in (13a-b), where the clitic is obligatory and the tonic pronoun alone cannot appear. In contrast, an indefinite pronoun such as *alguien* ('someone') does not double, as seen in (13c-d):

- (13) a. Lo vio a él.  
 lit. Him (cl. ac.) saw him  
 'He saw him'  
 b. \*Vio a él.  
 'He saw him'  
 c. Ayer vimos a alguien entrar en la tienda.  
 'Yesterday we saw someone enter the store'

- d. \*Ayer lo vimos a alguien entrar en la tienda.  
 lit. Yesterday him saw someone enter the store  
 ‘Yesterday we saw someone enter the store’

In an episodic context such as (14) – in which the arbitrary reading is excluded –, we obtain the concealing reading only in (14a), with doubling, that is, with the accusative clitic pronoun *la* (‘it<sub>fem.</sub>’) and the indefinite pronoun in the canonical position of direct object *a una* (‘to one<sub>fem.</sub>’), while in (14b), without doubling, only the existential reading ‘someone’ remains:

- (14) a. La vieron a una saltar por la ventana.  
 ‘I was seen jumping out of the window’  
 b. #Vieron a una saltar por la ventana.  
 ‘Some girl was seen jumping out of the window’

In a generic context, it is more difficult to discriminate between the concealing and the arbitrary reading. Thus, in (15a) one might think that we have both readings. However, if we look at the behavior with respect to the relative clauses, we see that only an appositive relative is possible (15b-c). The fact that the doubling is not possible with a restrictive relative clause (15b) indicates that the only reading in this case is the concealing, incompatible with restrictive relative clauses.

- (15) a. Cuando lo ayudan a uno, se agradece.  
 ‘When they help one, one is grateful’  
 b. \*Cuando lo ayudan a uno que está en apuros, se agradece.  
 ‘When they help one when one is in trouble, one is grateful’  
 c. Cuando lo ayudan a uno, que está en apuros, se agradece.  
 ‘When they help one, who is in trouble, it is appreciated’

To finish with the grammatical properties of the concealing *uno*, in anaphoric relations it behaves as a 1st person personal pronoun, as already pointed out by Fernández Ramírez (1986, p. 52), so that it can be used to make successive mentions of the same referent in a text. An indefinite pronoun, on the other hand, introduces a first mention, but then the referent is taken up again with a definite nominal phrase:

- (16) Una estaba ya cansada. Después de dar mil vueltas y de que le dijeran a una que se fuera, opté por irme de aquel lugar.

'One<sub>tem.</sub> was already tired. After going around a thousand times and being told to leave, I decided to leave that place'

In summary, we have seen so far that the concealing *uno* has many grammatical properties that bring it closer to a personal pronoun.<sup>15</sup> It is definite, so its meaning becomes something like 'this person, the person who speaks to you', instead of 'a person'. The pronoun is still 3rd person, as shown by agreement data, but the fact of being definite allows it to refer more easily to the speaker. Recall that other 3rd person definite nominal phrases are used to refer to the speaker, these noun phrases are sometimes called *imposters* (see Collins & Postal, 2012; Collins, 2014). In sentences such as *Si me pides consejo, este amigo te dice que no lo hagas* ('If you ask me for advice, this friend tells you not to do it') or in *Mamá te va a castigar si sigues así* ('Mom will punish you if you continue this way'), the third person nominal phrases *este amigo* ('this friend') and *mamá* ('mom') refer to the speaker. As we see, the procedure of using a third person nominal phrase to refer to a first person is not foreign to other languages.

After the analysis of the properties of the inclusive pronoun *uno*, the question we will try to answer is what is the difference between *uno* ('one') and *yo* ('I').

### 3. IMPERSONALITY: WHY *UNO* ('ONE') AND NOT *YO* ('I')?

In the previous sections we saw that the indefinite pronoun *uno* can be used to refer to the speaker. This behavior is unexpected because the pronoun *uno* has 3rd person morphological features that, in principle, designate what is being talked about, unlike what happens with the 1st and 2nd person, which correspond to the speaker and the addressee. From the discursive point of view, as we will see in this section, the inclusive values of *uno* have been explained as the result of a *desubjectivizing* strategy that defocalizes the agent and attempts to mitigate the presence of the self.

As we saw in section 2, existential<sup>16</sup> and generic readings of the pronoun *uno* can be recognized in the literature. Within the generic ones, we distinguish, on the

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15. In Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón (2024) we propose a formal analysis for the concealing *uno* in which the indefinite determiner rises from a lower position in the nominal projection, in which indefinites are placed, to the Determiner head in the DP projection, and thus acquires the definiteness feature. The meaning change from 'this person' to 'I' occurs through the binding of the DP *one* by a Speaker projection in the left periphery of the sentence: see Speas & Tenny (2003); or Collins & Postal (2012) and Collins (2014) for the analysis of *imposters*.

16. Within the existential readings, the indefinite *uno* can have an antecedent in the linguistic context (ia) or lack one (ib). As we indicated at the beginning of our work, these readings are not the object of our study.

one hand, readings in which *uno* appears in attributions that the speaker applies to himself/herself from his/her experience and can be extended to others (17a), or it appears in attributions that are based on general knowledge and can be applied to the speaker (17b). Finally, the pronoun *uno* appears in contexts in which the predication falls exclusively on the speaker, without establishing any generality (18).

- (17) a. Recuerdo que entrenaba con mi tío en dos zonas que ahora son muy conocidas por los corredores: el parque Cervantes, [...] un lugar espectacular donde uno puede correr hasta diez kilómetros de ida y otros tantos de vuelta. [Serrano, Antonio; Varona, Alfredo: *Correr, viajar, vivir. 70 carreras imprescindibles para conocer España*. Barcelona: Planeta, 2017. CORPES]

‘I remember training with my uncle in two areas that are now well known to runners: Cervantes Park, [...] a spectacular place where you can run up to ten kilometers there and back’

- b. los ensayos estadísticos de hipótesis son una moderna versión del principio medieval de la navaja de Occam que dice que uno no debe multiplicar las causas sin razón [Pérez Campdesuñer, Reyner ... [*et al.*]: «Aplicación de la estadística en las diferentes etapas del ciclo de vida». *Ciencias Holguín*. Holguín: ciencias.holguin.cu, 2002-04. CORPES]

‘statistical hypothesis testing is a modern version of the medieval principle of Occam’s razor, which says that one should not multiply causes without reason’

- (18) En enero la lluvia arruinó mucha fruta. [...] Uno tuvo que empeñar la camioneta para poder seguir, para no rendirse, para no cerrar el quiosco.  
‘In January the rain ruined a lot of fruit. [...] I had to pawn the truck to be able to go on, to not give up, to not close the kiosk’

From the syntactic point of view, we have argued that the indefinite pronoun *uno* gives rise to the unmarked or existential reading and to the arbitrary reading

- (i) a. Otros dos hombres, uno alto con sombrero y otro bajo de estatura, pasaron casi corriendo por su lado [Portugal Durán, Luis Alberto: «Cuestión de Karma». *Corazón de la noche: cuentos*. La Paz: Intigraph, 2004. CORPES]

‘Two other men, one tall in a hat and the other short in stature, almost ran past him’

- b. Algo más arriba de Tabanera había un pueblo tan remotísimo que su nombre lo decía todo: Antigüedad. [...] A menudo se oía decir a mi tía abuela Justí hablando de cualquier cosa: «Me lo ha dicho uno que ha venido de Antigüedad». [Lope, Manuel: *Azul sobre azul*. Barcelona: RBA, 2011. CORPES]

‘Somewhat above Tabanera there was a village so remote that its name said it all: Antigüedad. [...] You could often hear my great-aunt Justí talking about anything: ‘I heard it from someone who came from Antigüedad.’

(17), since the latter is the result of the variable introduced by the indefinite being bound by a generic operator in a generic context. On the other hand, there is a definite pronoun *uno*, which can appear in generic and episodic contexts, and gives rise to the concealing reading (18). Contrary to this proposal, in most works dealing with the subject, the difference between arbitrary and concealing use is attributed to discursive factors, since it is assumed that there is a single generic indefinite pronoun *uno* that hides the speaker to varying degrees depending on the linguistic and extralinguistic context.<sup>17</sup>

The indefinite pronoun *uno* with arbitrary reading has been characterized as an impersonal pronoun, since it lacks a specific referent (Gómez Torrego, 1992, § 3.4, Fernández Soriano & Táboas Baylín, 1999, § 27.2.2.2). In this sense, the indefinite *uno* shares properties with the plural third person empty pronoun (*En España comen bien* 'In Spain they eat well'), with the singular second person empty or express pronoun (*En España (tú) siempre comes bien* 'In Spain you always eat well'), with the so-called arbitrary subjects of infinitives (*Es importante comer bien* 'It is important to eat well') or with the subject of the impersonal construction with *se* (*En España se come bien* 'Spain is a good place to eat'). In all these cases the pronouns receive an indeterminate, human and sometimes generalizing interpretation, because they do not refer to a particular individual. On the other hand, what characterizes the indefinite *uno* and the second person in this arbitrary reading is that, in addition to referring to a generality of individuals, they usually include the speaker in their reference, as opposed to, for example, the use of a 3rd person plural, which excludes him/her.<sup>18</sup>

From a discursive point of view, it has been claimed that the pronoun *uno* and the second person singular pronoun in generic contexts have impersonalizing values and are used as strategies to hide the speaker (Hidalgo Navarro, 1996; Gelabert-Desnoyer, 2008; Guirado, 2011; Briz Gómez, 2011; Hugo Rojas, 2011; Rasson, 2016; León-Castro & Repede, 2018). Serrano Montesinos (2022) points out that the use of *uno* contributes to give a desubjectivizing style to the discourse that defocalizes

17. Among the works that assume this point of view are the following: Ridruejo Alonso (1981, p. 79); Hernanz Carbó (1990, p. 160); Gómez Torrego (1992, pp. 15-16); Hollaender (2002, pp. 127-128); Company Company & Pozas Loyo (2009, p. 1206); González Vergara & Hugo Rojas (2010, p. 648-649); Hurtado (2015, pp. 112-113). Some works, such as Gelabert-Desnoyer (2008, pp. 412-413); Flores-Ferrán (2009, p. 1811); or Rasson (2016, p. 247), establish between four and eight different subcategories of the pronoun *uno*, depending on whether its reference includes the speaker, the receiver or a generality.

18. For the inclusive value of the pronoun, see Ridruejo Alonso (1981); Fernández Ramírez (1986); Hernanz Carbó (1990); Gómez Torrego (1992); DeMello (2000); Hollaender (2002); Sánchez López (2002); Flores-Ferrán (2009); RAE-ASALE (2009); Dieck (2016); or Fábregas Alfaro (2024), among others.

the agent or the experiencer of the action. According to this works, the presence of the pronoun *uno* endows the discourse with the «third person style», which implies less engagement of the speaker with the expressed content and a more objective or general perspective. The reasons for using *uno* (‘one’) instead of *yo* (‘I’) are related to various communicative intentions, such as seeking acceptance or agreement on the part of the addressee, or protecting the speaker’s image from possible criticism.

In contemporary Spanish, the speaker has another option to refer to himself. This is the pronoun *uno* that we have called *concealing*, which is only equivalent to the speaker.<sup>19</sup> The reason for using this pronoun instead of the 1st person pronoun also has to do with a certain distancing, in the sense that the reference to the self is not direct. However, this distancing is not obtained through a generalization, as was the case with arbitrary use, but is obtained from the speaker’s choice not to use the 1st person pronoun directly.

It has been noted in the literature that the concealing *uno* appears frequently in spontaneous and expressive spoken language (Fernández Ramírez, 1986; Ridruejo Alonso, 1981; Hidalgo Navarro, 1996; Fernández, 2008; Pérez Álvarez & Alanís Torres, 2022). The impersonalizing character of *uno* allows the speaker to cover up his or her responsibility in utterances of an expressive nature. This pronoun is usually accompanied by utterances expressing negative moods such as disappointment, caution, distrust, personal discontent or indignation, so it is normal for it to appear in exclamatory sentences, as in the following examples taken from Fernández Ramírez (1986, § 8.2):

- (19) a. Se va uno haciendo viejo –murmuró–. Estas cosas me hacen efecto.  
 ‘I am getting old, he muttered. These things have an effect on me’  
 b. ¡Que tenga una que adular a estos hombres!  
 ‘That I have to flatter these men!’

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19. Pozas Loyo (2010, p. 5) points out that the concealing use of *uno* appears later in time than the arbitrary use. Although we have not studied it, it makes sense to think that the concealing *uno* develops from the arbitrary reading. The concealing *uno* referring to the first person would emerge as a contextual restriction of the meaning of the arbitrary *uno* with general value, as Ridruejo Alonso (1981) has pointed out; Fernández Ramírez (1986); Hernanz Carbó (1990); or Hollaender (2002). The idea is that *uno* starts from a generalization that includes the speaker, but this can be reduced to refer only to the speaker, depending on various linguistic and extralinguistic contextual factors. Given the frequent arbitrary use of the form *uno*, in which it often hides the speaker, this form ends up specializing its meaning and coming to mean only the 1st person, also in non-generic contexts. A similar development occurred in the case of the indefinite form Old Spanish *omne* (Company Company & Pozas Loyo, 2009).



The contexts pointed out by Fernández Ramírez are not the only ones in which we find the concealing *uno*, but they do illustrate a prototypical type of situation in which the speaker would wish to protect his or her image. Because of the negative charge of these contexts, it is reasonable that the speaker would use *one* as a pragmatic strategy to conceal himself/herself. Another context in which the concealing *uno* may appear is found when the speaker wants to express false modesty (León-Castro & Repede, 2018). In the example in (20), the speaker pretends to be humble. Precisely one way of not appearing arrogant is to avoid the first person pronoun *yo* and use the concealing *uno*.

- (20) —Bueno, uno hace lo que puede —respondió el monje. Este humilde servidor de Dios Todopoderoso y de nuestro abad contribuye con su granito de arena. [González Martínez, Juan: *El cuarteto del soneto. Una aventura inesperada*. Madrid: Luarna, 2010. CORPES]  
 ‘Well, I do what I can, replied the monk. This humble servant of Almighty God and of our abbot is doing his bit»

Also in relation to the distribution of the concealing *uno*, we saw in section 2.2, that this pronoun generally appears in episodic contexts that facilitate a specific reading that refers to a particular individual, in this case, the speaker. Because the concealing use is a substitute for the speaker, the feminine form *una* (‘one<sub>fem.</sub>’) frequently appears when the speaker is a woman (21). Less frequent is the use of the feminine form by a female speaker in the arbitrary use.

- (21) —Bueno, les dejo ya que una está pluriempleada y le falta tiempo. [Ruiz Zafón, Carlos: *La sombra del viento*. Barcelona: Planeta, 2003. CORPES]  
 ‘Well, I’ll leave you now that one<sub>fem.</sub> is moonlighting and one<sub>fem.</sub> is short of time’

In summary, the inclusive use of the pronoun *uno*, both in arbitrary and concealing readings, is used as a defocalizing strategy that minimizes the role of the speaker. This meaning relates *uno* to other constructions called *impersonals* in a broad sense. These are phenomena of desubjectivization, since, through the use of the third person, a concealment of the speaker who is more or less present in the discourse is carried out. In short, we are dealing with a strategy of pragmatic attenuation of the self (Briz Gómez, 1994).

#### 4. ANALYSIS OF SPANISH *UNO* ('ONE') FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SOURCE AND THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION

In this section we will examine the inclusive uses of *uno* from the perspective of *evidentiality* and *intersubjectivity*. We will see that, on the one hand, the pronoun *uno* gives clues about the source of the information, which oscillates between personal experience and general knowledge (section 4.1). On the other hand, we will see that the meaning of *uno* encodes what information is shared between speaker and hearer (section 4.2).

##### 4.1. *Evidentiality: from personal experience to general knowledge*

Inclusive readings of the pronoun *uno* have been explained as evidential strategies because they indicate the source of information or the perspective of the speaker (Fernández, 2008; González Vergara & Lima, 2009; González Vergara & Hugo Rojas, 2010; Hurtado, 2015; Vilinbakhova, 2024; Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Pérez-Ocón, 2024). In this section we will examine to what extent the generic use and the concealing use of the pronoun *uno* fit into the categories of direct or indirect evidentiality according to the model of Plungian (2010) and Aikhenvald (2018).

Evidentiality is a semantic-functional notion that encodes the source of knowledge of information.<sup>20</sup> Aikhenvald (2018) proposes six basic types represented in (22). Plungian (2010) classifies these values depending on whether the source of the information is personal or non-personal (i.e., whether or not the source of the information stems from the speaker's experience, beliefs, or reasoning); and whether it is direct or indirect (i.e., whether the speaker has first-hand information because he or she has acquired it through the senses or because he or she has participated in the events or the information is reported):

- (22) Evidential values based on Plungian (2010, p. 353); Aikhenvald (2018, fig. 1.3); Kittilä (2019, p. 1274); Sánchez López (2020, p. 230)
- Direct / personal information (first hand)  
 Visual: information acquired by sight.

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20. For Aikhenvald (2018) evidentiality is a grammatical category limited to languages with morphological paradigms of evidential distinctions, such as Quechua or Tupi-Guarani. However, we believe that it is worth studying this concept in languages without evidential morphemes but with strategies that give clues about the source of information. This point of view is adopted in the works collected in González Ruiz, Izquierdo Alegría & Loureda Lamas (2016).

- Non-visual sensory / participatory:<sup>21</sup> information obtained by other senses
- Indirect / personal information
- Inferential: based on visible or tangible evidence or results
- Presumptive: information other than that obtained by tangible results; includes logical reasoning (e.g. cause-effect), assumptions or general knowledge<sup>22</sup>
- Indirect / non-personal information (second-hand)
- Reportative: information heard without reference to the speaker
- Quotative: information heard with reference to the authorship of the source cited

In the Wintu language, spoken in Northern California, all the sentences in (23) mean 'he is chopping wood' (Aikhenvald, 2004, p. 60), but the evidential morpheme (marked in bold) adds the source of the information.

- (23) a. *k'upa-**be*** → visual  
 b. *k'upa-**nt<sup>h</sup>e*** → non-visual sensory  
 c. *k'upa-**re*** → inferential  
 d. *k'upa-**ʔel*** → presumptive  
 e. *k'upa-**ke*** → reportative

The same categories that we obtain in evidential languages can be expressed by other means in languages without evidential morphemes such as Spanish. In (24a), the speaker has first-hand information (direct and personal) because he/she has perceived the facts by the senses, which is marked grammatically by the first person and lexically by the verb of perception. In (24b-c) the information is obtained indirectly because the speaker has neither participated in the facts nor perceived them directly, but it is personal because the information comes either from an inference the speaker has made from the causal clause (24b) or from his general knowledge expressed by the sentence headed by *como* ('as') (24c). The source of the information is indirect and non-personal when it is obtained by

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21. Although we have added the category *participatory*, endophoric or egophoric evidence is not always considered a genuine source of information (as in Aikhenvald, 2004). Ego-evidence refers to the speaker's own (usually volitional) participation in the event denoted, as in the example *I am answering an email*.

22. Kittilä (2019, p. 1275) modifies (22) to include the category of general knowledge in two sections depending on whether the information is viewed as the speaker's own evidence (endophoric) or whether it comes from common knowledge (presumptive). This duality supports our idea that the speaker's inclusion within the pronoun reference *uno* can come from the speaker's experience or from a generalization.

words of other people, as in (24d), which is expressed by the sentence headed by *según* ('according to').

- (24) a. Vi a María caerse.  
 'I saw Mary fall'  
 b. María se ha caído, porque tiene una herida en la rodilla.  
 'María fell because she has a knee injury'  
 c. Como todo el mundo sabe, María sufrió una caída.  
 'As everyone knows, María suffered a fall'  
 d. Según dicen, María ha sufrido una caída.  
 'María has reportedly suffered a fall'

Bermúdez (2005) distinguishes within his model of evidentiality between the mode, the source and the access to information. According to these three axes, the mode in which information is accessed can be cognitive or sensory; the source or provenance of the information can be personal (if the speaker has experienced the event or deduced it) or external (if the speaker is not involved); the access to the information (or the degree to which the information is shared) can be universal or privative to the speaker. As we will see in the next section, access to information would not be part of *evidentiality per se*, but of *engagement*, which encodes the accessibility that the speaker and the addressee have to an entity or state of affairs.

Some pragmatic-discursive studies on *uno* employ Bermúdez's model to describe its evidential value (Fernández, 2008; González Vergara & Lima, 2009; González Vergara & Hugo Rojas, 2010). Fernández (2008, p. 225) points out that when using *uno*, the speaker places himself/herself as one of the possible participants of the action, so the source of the generalization is personal and the access is privative. However, for González Vergara & Lima (2009, p. 305) the source of the information is personal, but the access is universal, since the speaker's experience is extensible to others: «by choosing *uno*, the speaker expresses that what he/she affirms comes from his/her own experiences or beliefs, but that anyone can agree with him/her if he/she attends to his/her own» [our translation].


The examples in (25) show the contrast between the choice of the pronoun *uno* ('one'), *yo* ('I') and the noun phrase *el hombre* ('the man'). According to González Vergara & Lima (2009, p. 305), if the speaker chooses *uno*, the source of the information is personal and the access is universal; that is, the speaker indicates that what is expressed in the utterance does not necessarily come from his own experience and that the assertion corresponds to a widely known fact.

If he chooses the pronoun *yo*, the source is personal and the access is privative because the information comes from personal experience or belief, and is not necessarily supposed to be accessible to his interlocutor. If the speaker chooses the noun phrase *el hombre*, the source is neutral, because it is not indicated whether it is personal or external, but the access to this information is universal, just as for the pronoun *uno*.

- (25) a. *Uno* tiene que sufrir en esta vida para ser feliz después.  
 'One has to suffer in this life to be happy afterwards'
- a. *Yo* tengo que sufrir en esta vida para ser feliz después.  
 'I have to suffer in this life to be happy afterwards'
- b. *El hombre* tiene que sufrir en esta vida para ser feliz después.  
 'Man has to suffer in this life in order to be happy afterwards'

In summary, positions on the relevant evidential axes for the pronoun *uno* ('one'), *yo* ('I') and the generic noun phrase *el hombre* ('the man') would be those in (26):

(26) Evidential axes for *uno*, *yo* and *el hombre* (González Vergara & Lima, 2009, p. 306)



The two studies mentioned above do not coincide in the evidential characterization of *uno*. While for Fernández (2008) the source is personal and access is privative, for González Vergara & Lima (2009) the source is personal, and access is universal. We believe that these discrepancies derive from a problem related to the values assigned to *uno*. To avoid these problems, we will adopt the proposal in (27), partially based on Moltmann (2006) for the English *one*. As we saw in section 2.1.1, there are two strategies for including the speaker in the reference of the pronoun *uno*: we can infer from the 1st person starting from a particular experience of the speaker (28a); or we can infer to the 1st person starting from a

generalization (28b). In the first case *uno* can be paraphrased as ‘me and anyone like me’, while in the second case the paraphrase would be ‘anyone and, therefore, me too’. In addition, we proposed in section 2 that there is a different use of *uno*, the concealing, in which *uno* is equivalent to the speaker (28c) and is paraphrased by ‘this person’, ‘I’:

- (27) Inclusive values of *uno*
1. Generic or arbitrary use
    - a. Inference from the 1st person: experience > generalization
    - b. Inference to the 1st person: generalization > experience
  2. Concealing use
- (28) a. Uno puede correr hasta diez kilómetros en este parque  
 ‘One may run up to ten kilometers in that park’
- b. Uno debe ser feliz.  
 ‘One must be happy’
- c. Uno tuvo que trabajar duro para lograr su objetivo  
 ‘One had to work hard to achieve his goal’

In the case of the arbitrary *uno* that includes the speaker from an inference from the first person (28a), the source of the information is personal and direct, because it is first-hand information and part of the speaker’s experience. In the arbitrary use that makes an inference to the first person (28b), the source is personal, but indirect, since it is based on general knowledge and generalized outside the speaker’s experience. The concealing *uno* (28c), finally, falls into the category of direct and personal evidentiality.

With respect to general knowledge, in evidential languages, such as Mamaindé<sup>23</sup> or Central Pomo, there is a morpheme to refer to knowledge shared by all (Hintz & Hintz, 2014; Eberhard, 2018; Kittilä, 2019). The category called *general, mutual* or *common knowledge* would be similar to the usages we have called *arbitrary*, especially those ranging from generalization to experience. This category is characterized by indicating the joint perspective of the speaker and the addressee, and by presenting the information as more reliable.

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23. Mamaindé is a Nambikwara language family of west central Brazil. In this language, according to Eberhard (2018), the category of general knowledge refers to information that is known (or available to be known) by the whole community as part of the habitual experience of a collective, or part of the body of knowledge. General knowledge has an extension that is used to mark the veracity of a fact acquired by hearsay in order to convince the addressee.

In summary, we have established three values of *uno*: 1) arbitrary from the 1st person; 2) arbitrary toward the 1st person; 3) concealing. The source of the information is personal and direct for the first and the third, while for the second it is personal, but indirect, linked to the category of general knowledge. In the next section we will look at the values of *uno* relating to access to information.

#### 4.2. *Uno* ('one') vs. *yo* ('I'): *shared engagement*

As we saw in the previous section, the evidential model of Bermúdez (2005) distinguishes between the source and access to information. However, access to information is conceived as part of *intersubjectivity* or *engagement* in the works of Bergqvist & Kittilä (2017), Evans, Bergqvist & San Roque (2018a), Evans, Bergqvist & San Roque (2018b) or Floyd, Norcliffe & San Roque (2018). This section aims to study *uno*'s values in terms of information accessibility.

As was the case with information source or evidentiality, there are languages with morphological paradigms that encode the accessibility that the speaker and addressee have to an entity or state of affairs. Participants in communication need to constantly adjust their states of knowledge. In the words of Evans, Bergqvist & San Roque (2018a, p. 212) «speakers in real time need constantly to bring about adjustments to each other's attention, beliefs, and states of knowledge - directing, persuading, and informing, at the same time as indicating empathy and deference (or their absence)». This notion of *intersubjectivity* is known as *engagement* and there are languages, such as Andoke, spoken in Colombia, that have grammaticalized this information, in the same way that Romance languages have grammaticalized tense or mood. Let us look at the following examples, taken from Evans, Bergqvist & San Roque (2018a, p. 114):

- |   |                           |                    |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------|
| (29) a. <i>páa</i>  | <i>b-ɔ</i>                | <i>ɔ-pó'kə-i</i>   |
| already   | +SPKR+ADDR.ENGAG-3SG.INAN | 3SG.INAN-light-AGR |
| ‘The day is dawning (as we can both see).’                            |                           |                    |
| b. <i>páa</i>   | <i>kě-ø</i>               | <i>ɔ-pó'kə-i</i>   |
| already   | +SPKR-ADDR.ENGAG-3SG.INAN | 3SG.INAN-light-AGR |
| ‘The day is dawning (as I witness, but which you were not aware of).’ |                           |                    |

The auxiliaries *bɔ* and *kě* (similar to the copula *is*), which precede the main verb *ɔpókəi* ‘dawn’, consist of two parts: the first element (*b-* or *kě-*) encodes engagement (the relative access of speaker and hearer) and the second element

marks subject agreement. No enunciative sentence can be constructed in Andoke without a morpheme indicating engagement. In this language, if speaker and hearer are watching the sun rise together, a sentence like (29a) is used with the auxiliary base *b-* (represented as ‘more speaker engagement and more addressee engagement’, +spkr+addr.engag). However, if the event is not accessible to the addressee, a sentence like (29b) with base *kə̃* (+spkr-addr.engag) would be chosen. What these auxiliaries are marking is whether the hearer is attending or has access to the event. Engagement, therefore, encodes the presence or absence of intersubjective exchange, whatever the source of the information.<sup>24</sup>

In Andoke, the difference between the examples in (29) lies in whether or not the access to information is shared, what Evans, Bergqvist & San Roque (2018a) call *(un)shared engagement*. If we apply the notion of *intersubjectivity* to the examples in (30) from Spanish, we can see that both sentences express the idea that the speaker is included in *uno*’s reference. Also included in that reference is anyone who may be in a similar situation to the speaker. In RAE-ASALE (2009, § 15.8m) it is pointed out that «The indefinite *uno* gives rise to generic nominal phrases that can allude to any individual. The predications in which they concur often express experiences, ideas or feelings of the speaker that are supposed to be extrapolated to others» [our translation].

- (30) a. Uno puede correr hasta diez kilómetros en este parque.  
 ‘One may run up to ten kilometers in that park’  
 b. Uno no debe mentir.  
 ‘One must not lie’

We believe that in (30a) and (30b) the information expressed in the sentence corresponds to a shared knowledge to which the speaker and the hearer have access, either because the addressee can put himself in the speaker’s place,<sup>25</sup> as in (30a), or

24. As with the notion of evidentiality, we can assume that information accessibility can be extended to the analysis of languages that do not have this dimension grammaticalized in the verbal paradigm. In European languages we can find information related to engagement/intersubjectivity in the definiteness contrasts of the article system or in the notions of theme and rhema of the informative structure. Intersubjectivity is also expressed in the system of demonstrative determiners or in interrogative sentences. In all these cases, the speaker must elaborate hypotheses about the mental states of the addressee and about the information to which the hearer has access. The domain of intersubjectivity coordination is relevant for the analysis of all these phenomena.

25. For examples similar to those in (30), Moltmann (2006, p. 258) indicates that the speaker has not had to walk that distance through the park, but can put himself in someone else’s role and assume that anyone could do it. That is, the inference from the speaker’s experience can be a real or simulated



because this information is part of a general knowledge, a norm or a law, as in (30b). Thus, the two arbitrary readings of the pronoun *uno*, both the one that goes from personal experience to generalization and the one that goes in the reverse order, are strategies for coordinating intersubjectivity and express shared engagement.

However, the concealing pronoun *uno* in (31a) and the first person pronoun *yo* in (31b) encode information that is privative to the speaker. The reference of these pronouns is exclusively the speaker and, therefore, access to the information is restricted to the speaker (unshared engagement).

- (31) a. *Uno tuvo que trabajar duro.*  
 'One had to work hard'  
 b. *Yo debo ser feliz.*  
 'I must be happy'

Thus, in addition to the evidential values mentioned in the previous section, we can add those related to engagement:

- (32) Engagement values of *uno*
1. Generic or arbitrary use
    - a. experience > generalization 'me and anyone like me' → personal and direct source + shared engagement
    - b. generalization > experience 'anyone and, therefore, me too' → personal and indirect source + shared engagement
  2. Concealing use 'I' → personal and direct source + unshared engagement

It is important to keep in mind that evidentiality and engagement acquire different values depending on the context, especially in languages that do not have these dimensions grammaticalized. Thus, the examples in (31), which in principle express unshared engagement, could appear in contexts that express shared engagement (33):

- (33) a. *Como sabéis, uno tuvo que trabajar duro*  
 'As all you know, one had to work hard'  
 b. *Como sabéis, yo debo ser feliz*  
 'As all you know, I must be happy'

---

experience that can be generalized. The speaker pretends to be other people and can attribute properties to them by self-assigning these properties to him/herself.

To conclude this section, we would like to point out that the speaker makes a hypothesis about what the addressee knows or does not know, so that shared accessibility always implies a multiple perspective. While speakers have direct access to their own perspective and can therefore state with certainty what they know, attend to or perceive, in the case of the addressee the speakers can only assume it, with varying degrees of certainty. Thus, evaluation about the knowledge held by others involves taking into account a complex perspective, which represents the speaker's assumption about the addressee's state of attention or access with respect to some state of affairs.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have studied the pronoun *uno* in the uses in which it refers to the speaker from the grammatical and pragmatic points of view, and we have tried to show the division of tasks between grammar and pragmatics implied by the use of this pronoun, which is indefinite and 3rd person. Our starting point has been that it is first necessary to explain why the grammar allows these deviant uses of the grammatical person, and then, once we have shown how the system allows to use *uno* to refer to the first person, we have seen what it implies for a speaker in a context of use to have this added option for the reference to the 1st person and to choose to use the form *uno* to refer to himself/herself.

In the division of tasks between grammar and pragmatics, we have started with the grammatical system. We have seen that the two uses of *uno* occur in differentiated syntactic contexts, the arbitrary *uno* appears in generic contexts, in which it basically means 'any person'. The way to access the reference to the speaker is through generalization, which can go in two different directions: one starts from the speaker and generalizes, or one starts from a generalization and arrives at the speaker. The way to obtain the first-person meaning is a pragmatic inference. The frequent use of the arbitrary *one* to refer to the self has probably led to the extension implied by the concealing use, in which *uno* can refer to the speaker without the intervention of a generalization and, therefore, can also appear in episodic contexts. In this second case, we have shown that the form *uno* has the grammatical behavior of a personal pronoun and thus constitutes a definite nominal phrase initially meaning 'this person' and from there, 'I'.

From a discursive point of view, the inclusive use of the pronoun *uno*, both in arbitrary and concealing readings, is a defocalizing strategy that minimizes

the role of the speaker. Although Spanish has not grammaticalized evidentiality and engagement in its verbal paradigm, we have shown that the pronoun *uno* encodes information about these two dimensions. The two arbitrary uses coincide in expressing shared information, in contrast to the concealing reading and the first personal pronoun. On the other hand, the arbitrary use based on experience coincides with the concealing reading and the first personal pronoun in expressing personal and direct source. It differs from arbitrary usage based on generalization in that the latter encodes personal but indirect evidentiality.

#### DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP CONTRIBUTION

In all parts of the paper the authors have participated jointly. Both have formulated the formal analysis and discussed the issue of the meaning of the constructions. The two authors have drafted and revised the article. The order of appearance of the authors' names follows the alphabetical order, as is usual in the field of linguistics.

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